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Abstract 
This paper explores the role of social capital and governance in rural development within 
Slovensky Raj National Park. Based on the theory of Common Pool Resources and Network 
Governance, the case study explores the external and internal influences on cooperation.  
Current decision making in the Park is still affected by post socialist relations. In particular 
inefficient institutional design and non-robust governance of the resources have resulted in 
over-exploitation of natural resources and treating common property as open-access. On one 
hand, evidence emerged on domination of interpersonal trust and failure of institutional 
design. These were found as barriers for the National Park to be viewed by various actors as 
an asset. On the other hand, municipal and tourism networks show that cooperation is 
gradually moving from being externally to internally driven, while displaying characteristics 
of bottom-up development. A hierarchical governance structure is thus slowly opening up, 
shifting towards networks. 
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1 Introduction 
Generally, it is accepted that totalitarian regimes destroy social capital (Paldam and Svenson 
2000; Putnam 1993) and that low social capital leads to a number of dysfunctions. It was also 
proven (Putnam 1993) that there is a correlation between the duration of a dictatorship and 
deformation of trust and cooperation. Examples from Latin American societies show that a 
narrow radius of trust produces a two-tiered moral system, which serves as a cultural 
foundation for corruption, often regarded as a legitimate way of looking after one’s family 
(Putnam 1993).  Within democratic countries of Europe, on the experience from southern 
Italy, low social capital has been identified as one of the major reasons for the inefficient local 
governance (Banfield 1958; Putnam 1993). In contrast with western European countries, the 
regulatory processes of former command and control economies of central and eastern 
European countries (CEECs) can be characterised by closed, unidirectional decision-making, 
excluding all those who are not members of elite political structures, rejecting constructive 
criticism which might have indicated system change (Gatzweiler 2003).  
CEECs have undergone unprecedented political and economic changes since the fall of the 
Berlin wall in 1989 and most of them have made considerable progress in the area of 
structural reforms. The former regime, represented by massive state interventions, state 
monopolies and absolute control over all actions – resulted in a dramatic decline of trust in 
formal institutions and erosion of personal relationships as the political elite was established. 
Interpersonal relations emerges as the only trustful institution left (Chloupkova et al. 2003; 
Murray 2005).  Formal ‘grey/black’ network (Paldam and Svenson 2000) has been created as 
a result of these processes and converted into negative social capital. This is slowing the 
processes of democratisation and reform. Trust in formal institutions must therefore be 
restored, regardless of the difficulties, of time and effort, encountered in achieving this. Due 
to these factors, transition cannot be understood as a free evolution, since both 
democratisation from 1989 and EU integration in 2004 were driven externally1. Evidence of 
growing participation and cooperation in transition countries of the CEE has been reported by 
several authors (Hagedorn and Gatzweiler 2002) mostly linked to emerging markets. 
                                                 
1  As example accession process to the EU cannot be simply understood as a definite response, as this 
politically-driven process has resulted in a more or less mechanical transposition of formal norms and rules 
without either sufficient change in the institutional environment or the evolution of new social capital capable 
of reconstruction or building internal societal rules and norms.     
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The situation in the Slovak Republic may be unique. Firstly, the Slovak Republic, 
historically a part of a larger political unit (Austro-Hungarian empire 1300-1918, 
Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1993), was generally under-represented at both the policy and 
decision-making levels, and as such very seldom governed by its own representatives2. Thus, 
in comparison with neighbouring countries (Sauer 2005, Jílková 2003, Romancikova 2004) 
that built their national or regional governance structures themselves, there is an evident lack 
of skills in such institutions in Slovakia3. Secondly, Slovak traditional society is largely based 
on rather closed rural Roman-Catholics communities, with traditional and anti-reformist 
behaviour. The above-mentioned factors, add to the overall status of social capital in 
Slovakia.  Furthermore, informal cooperation is also hindered by “grey/black” network4.  
Democratisation since 1989 and EU integration since 2004 form the key external drivers in 
our study. Under the transition process, major issues analysed were the property rights 
regimes, in particular the failure of the State in managing natural resources (in de facto open 
access regimes). Determinants studied within EU integration are the effects of EU 
membership on the rural context, trust building and emerging institutional innovations such as 
multilevel governance. Such drivers are considered as key factors of bottom-up development, 
with effects on cooperation.  This paper tests the hypothesis that regardless of whether 
cooperation was initiated by external drivers, it gradually moves towards being internally 
driven. This allows the establishment of a robust governance structure of common pool 
resources. The general objective of this research was to analyse processes of cooperation in 
rural development and multi actor interactions in the Slovensky Raj National Park (SRNAP). 
In particular the role of multiple drivers in institutional change and how they interact within a 
multilevel governance of SRNAP.  
A case study approach has been chosen for our paper, given that it makes it possible to 
explore more variables, themes and subjects within specific real-life context (Gray 2004; Yin 
                                                 
2  Prior to 1945, most public representatives including teachers, attorneys or public servants were from 
Hungary (up to 1918) or the Czech Republic (1918-1939).  
3  Although the first wholesale and credit cooperative in continental Europe (Gazdovský spolok 1845), was 
founded in Slovakia, this was the individual activity of a few strong regional actors acting in defence against 
the upper classes. A more common form of rural partnership was that of land ownership, cooperative or 
semiprivate ownership, finally destroyed by the nationalisation of all property in 1948.  
4  Examples are taken from civic societies, which in the Slovak Republic are not necessarily representing real 
public interests. Very often interpersonal relations and individual interest dominates. Thus rather than 
enabling the evolution of informal rules and partnerships, several non-profit organisations represent the 
interests of elite groupings close to governmental structures and funds.  
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2003) in particular the exploration of cooperation which is determined by local organisation 
and localised responses to social dilemma (Murray 2005).  In order to have more measures as 
well as the issue of validity and reliability of case study data, diverse methods for data 
collection were adopted. These methods are first of all semi-structured interviews which were 
conducted in the period of May-July 2005. They were constructed using the Guidelines for 
Interview developed within the IDARI project in early spring 2005 and were adapted to the 
local conditions. In total 28 actors were approached; of these, two refusals were given and 26 
interviews completed. The average length of interview varied from 30 to 90 minutes. 
Moreover we have used secondary data sources and interview records of primary data 
gathered for another case study within the IDARI project, focused on tourism activities. Data 
collected were analysed in qualitative way using frequency of cooperation as major criteria 
for the measurement. 
 Part 2 of the paper describes the evolution of governance in the Slovak Republic. Part 3 
provides a basic theoretical framework concentrated along three interlinked trajectories: the 
network definition of social capital; the role of trust and learning in cooperative processes; 
and finally how social mechanisms can influence multilevel governance and effective 
management of common pool resources. Part 4, provides a basic description of the model 
region and examines major barriers for network governance, while part 5 concentrates on the 
description of the dynamics of ongoing cooperation processes among multileveled actors, 
defined as actor clustering. Part 6, then explores major findings of empirical work which are 
concluded in last section.  
2 Governance in the Slovak Republic 
Prior to EU membership, decision-making in the Slovak Republic was two fold: via elected 
representatives at the national and municipal levels; and via state authority, represented by the 
national government and districts. Most decisions were taken at the level of district 
administration. Harmonisation with the EU legislation introduced a shift of competencies 
from administration at former district offices to municipalities and the newly established 
elected regional governments, meaning more power to the regional and local level. Moreover 
new European rural policy, emphasise creation of supra national actors and the growing role 
of sub-national level resulting in a multi-levelled system of governing. The shift of 
competencies to multiple authorities has the potential of increasing the role of actors from 
outside the formal decision making boundaries and therefore greater participation in the 
governance process. This results in governance structures that may rely on networks of multi-
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level interconnected actors such as private, public or non-profit units, rather than a hierarchy 
dominated and defined by the State (Stoker 1998).  
In the area of environmental protection in the Slovak Republic, the Ministry of the 
Environment serves as a central body at the national level. Responsibilities in nature 
conservation are under   the executive control of the State Nature Conservation agency, 
represented in each region by the administrations of national parks. The system of nature 
conservation territories was established in 1948, the main stress being on conservation. 
Because of the absence of a market economy, outdoor recreation was limited by the State, 
who controlled visitors. Today national parks in the Slovak Republic are greatly increasing 
their tourist numbers, creating pressures for investment, and thus parks are also being viewed 
from competing interests. The existing governance structure in nature conservation has not 
adequately adapted yet. The Park Administration acts as the first contact point in rural 
development processes, but paradoxically, it has only an advisory position to the hierarchical 
authority, who formally makes decisions (State Nature Conservancy and regional 
administrative units). With respect to nature conservation and regional development, there are 
difficulties in the coordination of responsibilities. This results from missing formal 
institutional links between the elected regional and local agencies, as well as between other 
related State actors (such as forest, agriculture and tourism authorities). An example of this 
lack of coordination is evident from the inadequate implementation of the Nature Protection 
Act, which required zoning of parks, compensation for removal of opportunities for non-state 
owners within protected areas amongst other criteria. To make matters worse, several legal 
provisions conflict with one another, especially those falling under the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and particularly with respect to the management of forestry and 
agriculture5. Failure of the State to manage natural resources in an effective manner resulted 
in a de facto open access resource regime6. It is too early to analyse the effect of 
decentralisation of environmental governance as the process was initiated only in 2002, and is 
still not fully effective. Despite this, it is already possible to summarise that the fragmentation 
of nature protected areas still remains a problem, and makes management of protected areas 
difficult.  
                                                 
5  For example, the Act on Nature Conservation declares the protection of nature as a fundamental priority 
within protected areas; however, the Act on Forests allows timber production within areas of nature 
conservation, even providing subsidies for activities in areas with extreme climatic conditions. 
6  As defined in common pool resource theory by  E. Ostrom, (1990)  and further elaborated in this article. 
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3 The Concept of Social Capital and Governance  
Social capital can be characterised according to the variety of different views or dimensions 
that have originated in the interdisciplinary character of this concept. This study endorses a 
rational choice theory approach, while also acknowledging the importance of social and 
political engagement or network approach. Despite variations in the origin and differing 
definitions of social capital7, the concept has common characteristics based on the formation 
of social networks. We see this as crucial for understanding the transformation of social 
capital in transition countries of CEE. An approach based on community bottom-up 
cooperation linked to social capital is seen as important for later stages of policy reform, in 
particular for countries in transition from directive to democratic regimes (Valentinov 2004). 
The concept as adopted in our study is thus based on a network definition of social capital and 
endorses the notion of social capital as the nature of relationships between people and the 
social networks that they form (Murray 2005).    
Furthermore, many authors distinguish factors of social capital formation especially trust, 
reciprocity and learning (Ostrom 2003; Sobel 2002; Valentinov 2004; Putnam 1993). To 
illustrate our approach we borrowed the concept of a structural model of social capital found 
in Figure 1 (Brehm and Rahn 1997). Trust as a major determinant of social capital is framed 
within the context of interpersonal trust (informal governance), which is developed through 
the learning process into the institutional trust (formal governance). 
 
                                                 
7  The rational choice theory sees social capital as a set of informal norms that promotes cooperation to make 
effective market transactions (Fukuyama 2000). Using political or social engagement theory, social capital is 
viewed as the social ties or communities of association. According to Putnam (1995) social capital is 
represented by features of social life, norms and trust that enable actors to cooperate. Ostrom and Ahn (2003) 
define social capital as rules used by those governing, managing, and using the system and those factors that 
reduce the transaction costs associated with the monitoring and enforcement of these rules. Finally Bourdieu 
(1985) defines social capital as the aggregate of the actual or potential resources that are linked to the 
possession of a durable network of more-or-less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or 
recognition.  
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Figure 1: Structural Model of Social Capital 
Source: Brehm and Rahn (1997) 
Central to this model is the reciprocal relationship between civic participation and 
interpersonal trust. The more individuals participate in their communities, the more they learn 
to trust others; the greater the trust that individuals hold for others, the more likely they are to 
participate. This creates a virtuous circle in which trust promotes cooperation and cooperation 
promotes trust. This also increases confidence in the hierarchical structures of the State and 
the reverse8. The structural linkage of figure 1 (confidence in government and civic 
engagement) has not been proven empirically9.  
This paper argues that through the process of learning and repeated interaction, individuals 
are willing to cooperate (Brehm and Rahn 1997). Here the learning process can be understood 
as long-lasting change of behaviour that is founded on change in knowledge; however it can 
only be observed through the results of this new knowledge in actual change of behaviour 
(Siebenhuner 2004). Within the process of learning, past experiences in the situation of 
cooperation can affect subsequent behaviour and attitudes toward cooperating (Murray 2005).  
In the context of the emerging multilevel governance structure and ongoing learning 
processes, governance is shifting to new ways of conceptualization where the citizen is 
playing an active role (Goodwin 1998) and boundaries between and within public and private 
sectors have become blurred (Stoker 1998). New European official policy statements now 
emphasize the role of partnerships and networks beyond the formal structure of governance 
(notably in the Cork Declaration, and more recently in the Rural Development Regulation 
2007-2013) characterized by informal social systems rather than by bureaucratic structures. 
Such a concept of governance has gained widespread attention across many scholars 
                                                 
8  Empirical evidence was manifested by for example Levi (1988), Scholz and Pinney (1995), see Brehm and 
Rahn (1997)..  
9  However a hypothesis was presented on the negative correlation between civic engagement and confidence 
in government by Tocqueville (1969). 
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(Williamson 1979, 1991; Stoker 1998; Jones et al. 1997; Goodwin 1998; Gulati 1998) and is 
known as network governance. The concept implies that governance has become a more 
complex and multilevel institution, partially usurping competences from the central State 
(Jessop 1995) and relying on networks of interconnected actors rather than a hierarchy 
dominated and defined by the State (Stoker 1998). Our approach integrates a general theory 
of network governance (Jones et al. 1997) and common-pool resource theory (Ostrom 1990).     
It asserts that this type of governance, by using different social mechanisms other than 
authority, bureaucratic rules, standardization, or legal resources enhance cooperative 
behaviour and at the same time enable local actors to organise collective arrangements that 
will promote their locality in an increasingly competitive local economy (Goodwin 1998). 
Jones et al. (1997) defined these social mechanisms as the: restriction of access, collective 
sanctioning, macroculture10 (norms, routines, conventions) and reputation. Restricted access 
limits the number of players, macroculture reduces transaction costs of communication and 
coordination among actors, reputation provides information about participants’ actions and 
credibility, and collective sanctions discourage participants from yielding to incentives for 
short-term opportunistic behaviour. The above social mechanisms within network governance 
dovetails with Putman’s approach (1993) to conditions that favour cooperation (the number of 
players are limited, information about each player’s past behaviour is abundant, as well as 
graduated sanctions against violators) as well as Ostrom’s review (2004) of the attributes of 
the communities that affect cooperative behaviour of actors. Moran and Ostrom (2005) 
identifies the values of behaviour generally accepted in the community norms, the level of 
common understanding that participants share about the structure of the action situation, size 
of the community and distribution of resources among those affected. The ways in which 
small-scale communities negotiate access to resources by setting up self-organized systems of 
participation and control are seen as more effective than government imposed regulations 
(Ostrom 1990). Thus in our understanding the social mechanisms derived from the theory of 
network governance reflect Ostrom’s theory of common pool resources (1990). From 
different case studies of long-term robust institutions for governing the common pool 
resources, she developed a set of general principles that increase performance of institutional 
design and robust governance of the resources and at the same time safeguard sustainable use 
                                                 
10  Macroculture is a system of widely shared assumption and values comprising knowledge that guide actions 
and create typical behaviour patterns among independent entities and is shared by all participants not only 
top managers. In general, macroculture are enhanced by close geographic proximity, because of the increased 
likelihood and ease of interaction (Jones, Hesterly and Borgaty 1997).  
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of common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990)11. The principles together help to solve core 
problems associated with free riding and subtractability of use. Monitoring, sanctioning and 
conflict resolution mechanisms can be thought of as feedback control for resource use. They 
transform information about the state of the system into actions that influence the system. 
Without regular access to low-cost and rapid conflict resolution mechanisms, the common 
understanding about what rules mean can be lost. Gradual sanctions preserve a sense of 
fairness by allowing flexible punishment when there is a disagreement about rule infraction. 
The lack of appropriate institutional design and robust governance of the resources 
(Williamson 1979, 1991; Ostrom 1999; Vatn 2005) may lead to a shift of costs to a third 
agent, stimulate  over-harvest and free-ride or to say it in other words an open access regime 
which may have tragic consequences in the overuse or unregulated management of natural 
resources and biodiversity values. In this light network governance can be seen as dynamic 
process of organizing transactions, by explaining the influence of social processes over the 
costs of transaction exchange. 
Thus in our empirical study we develop a framework for understanding the interplay of 
those social mechanisms and design principles especially macroculture, reputation and 
conflict resolution that can affect durable networks, and thus increase cooperation between 
rural actors while at the same time prevent tragedy of the open access.   
4 Presentation of the Region and Problem Situation 
The Slovenský Raj (‘Slovak Paradise’) national park SRNAP – with an area of 19,760 ha was 
established as a protected area by law in 1964, and in 1988 its status was changed to that of 
‘national park’. The most valuable natural aspect of the park is the relief that comprises of a 
compact eroded benchland with a plateau cut by deep canyons, waterfalls, and small rivers, 
thus making it scenic and of value for tourism. The administration of SRNAP is not simple, as 
it lies within the territories of both the Kosice and Presov regions, while Spisská Nova Ves 
serves as the regional centre. It influences economic and social relationships both within the 
park and in its surrounding municipalities. The economic situation in the target region is 
considered disadvantaged. The regional disparities are due to poor infrastructure, 
geographical barriers and an under utilisation of human resources. These characteristics make 
eastern parts of the country a ‘periphery’, unattractive for foreign investors, or to a qualified 
                                                 
11 There are the following: clearly defined boundaries, proportional equivalence between benefits and cost, 
collective-choice arrangements, monitoring, gradual sanctions, conflict resolution mechanisms, minimal 
recognition of right to organize and nested enterprise 
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labour force. Due to the lack of economic opportunities, there is a growing interest in tourism. 
This is especially the case in areas with high biodiversity, which have the potential of income 
generation for the local population. Slovenský Raj is the only park in the country aiming to 
join European network of protected areas Pan Parks12.     
Three major problem areas related to rural development and nature conservation can be 
identified in SRNAP, namely property rights and user interests; governance structure of 
resources and administration; and cooperation practices. 
4.1 Property Rights and User Interests 
Property rights represent the fundamental barrier to nature conservation in the Slovak 
Republic. As documented in all former communist CEECs, State property was promoted 
against private and common property. The government failed to manage the Park in an 
effective manner (design and implementation of effective rules limiting access and defining 
rights and duties) and created de jure State property but de facto open access (Ostrom 1990), 
with all the inherent effects such as free-riding and overexploitation.  The privatisation of land 
in the 1990s, oriented more on moral and political targets rather than effectiveness13, resulted 
in an increase of land fragmentation and market failure, which has been called the ‘tragedy of 
the privates’ (Hann 2000). The present ownership structure in the Slovak national parks is 
diverse, with almost 50% held in either private or community hands. An absence of 
appropriate incentives to encourage sustainable behaviour of non-State owners14 and an 
absence of robust governance of the resources has resulted in the expansion of unsustainable 
economic activities, namely intensive tourism and timber extraction. The key question today 
revolves around who will control the local assets, either generating decent revenues in the 
                                                 
12  The major mission of the Pan Parks project initiated by WWW International is to promote synergy between 
nature conservation and local development through sustainable tourism in European protected areas. Five 
Pan Parks principles, covering environmental, social, economic and cultural aspects are a formative 
precondition for the certification of candidates to the network and this makes them eligible for network 
benefits such as marketing programmes, projects in rural tourism and presentation of good practice, see also 
www.panpark.org 
13  Privatisation not based on the property rights theory e.g. fulfilling basic attributes property rights regimes and 
governance (Hagedorn and Gatzweiler 2002). 
14   The Act on Nature Conservation, adopted in 1995, introduced compensation for the removal of opportunities 
for the loss of potential income generation by private and municipal owners. The governmental order to 
administrate such a right came into force at the end of 2001 and the application process is very complex, not 
transparent and is lacking State support. By the end of 2002 only two owners were able to get compensation 
but none of them from SRNAP.  
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long term (if managed in a sustainable way) or much greater short-term benefits based on 
natural resource exploitation. 
4.2 Governance Structure 
The park territory is held under the competence of numerous mainly hierarchical authorities 
and divided between more administrative units. Such multiple decision-making structures 
without proper governance rules have a significant effect on the coordination of 
responsibilities, resulting in various conflicting responses to forest fires, resource overuse, 
illegal activities in the park or the ignoring of several legal provisions.  In SRNAP for 
example, the general territorial competences presiding over the park are shared by 15 
municipalities and two regional governments; specific competences are held by several State 
organisations, such as the water management, fire and forest authorities. The Nature 
Conservation Administration lacks any legal power but is responsible for preserving 
biodiversity, and thus is heavily limited in carrying out its responsibilities. As a result, unique 
park territories have been seriously affected by fire and/or by uncontrolled numbers of 
visitors.  
4.3 Cooperation Structure 
Community cooperation such as the development and implementation of rural policies   and 
alternative economic programs is weak due to the widespread lack of communication and 
cooperation between key actors. Powerful policy incentives (financial or institutional) are not 
sufficient to motivate them to carry out joint actions.  An illustrative example is the 
difficulties in implementing the Pan Parks certification, in particular, the ability of the park 
community to cooperate in the development and implementation of a Sustainable Tourism 
Development Strategy. The drawing of this strategy requires multi-level actor’s cooperation 
which has not been reached in SRNAP so far.   
5 Presentation and Clustering of Actors. 
In general, actors are understood as discrete individuals, corporate or collective social units 
coming from different groups and networks (Faust and Wasserman, 1994). For the purposes 
of this study, actors are understood as any individual, any grouping of individuals or any 
organisation having key roles in ongoing rural processes or certain interests, responsibilities 
in the management of the resource regimes of the community. The selection of actors for our 
analyses was based on previous experience and knowledge from SRNAP and on the 
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impact/importance approach. With the latter approach,  ‘importance’ is gauged by the actors’ 
role in the community, for example how powerful actors are in influencing action situations in 
the community. ‘Impact’ is determined by the effect of action situation on actors or how 
strongly they are influenced by a particular action situation.  Actors involved come from 
different fields, and comprise of a multiple actors setting. Using the concept of network 
governance described in theoretical section, in particular social mechanisms, actors were then 
clustered according to types of governance (Williamson 1991). Cooperation between the 
groups, the interaction of formal and informal institutions and the role of trust in the 
adaptation process for multilevel governance formed the major attributes of clustering. Actors 
were then clustered into the following three groupings of: the ‘hierarchies’; the ‘market’ and 
the ‘networks’ (Figure 2). 
5.1 The ‘Hierarchies 
The ‘hierarchical’ cluster is composed of organisations with formal responsibilities in a 
specific field of expertise. Their cooperation relates to their exercise of these responsibilities 
by means of formalised institutions. None of them are economically active in the regions. The 
cluster comprises of the State agriculture authority, forest authority, the park administration 
and the regional government. 
The State agriculture authority (the Chamber of Agriculture) is an organisation established 
by the State to coordinate, inform and support the implementation of State agricultural 
policies. Agro-tourism is seen as an economic opportunity for underdeveloped regions.  
The forest authority is a State organization with formal responsibilities in the field of 
forestry. It acts on district level where the cooperation with other clusters (especially with the 
market cluster e.g landowners) is based on formal responsibilities for keeping evidence of 
forest in the area, according to the type of owners and the upkeep of a register of forest 
owners. Due to the cross-over of responsibilities with the Ministry of the Environment and 
several controversial provisions in the legal setting as described in the introduction15 the State 
agriculture authority and forestry authority have an antagonistic relationship with the park 
administration. Relationships with other actors are regarded as rather neutral. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15  E.g. conflicting categorisation of the forest resulting in adverse subsidies for timber within nature protected 
forestland. 
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Figure 2: Governance structure in SRNAP. 
Source: Authors 
The regional government Kosice in the region is represented by the Spisská Nová Ves 
department, which was established by the Act on Regional Administrative Reform (passed in 
2001) according to EU regional policy and in order to decentralise power. The regional 
government received major responsibilities in regional development, environmental 
protection as well as social policies. Although reform is not yet complete16, it is evident that 
                                                 
16  Financial decentralisation effective from 2005 will for the first time in the history of the country decentralise 
the collection of income tax; 70% will remain at regional level, 23% at municipal level and only 7 % will be 
allocated at the central level. 
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the regional government will play a crucial role in regional planning and decision-making.  
As this body is rather new in the regional executive, analysis of the impacts of its activities in 
the region is not yet possible. For the same reason, the organisation suffers from a lack of 
professional skills to undertake its responsibilities in regional planning and nature 
conservation. In spite of this, a strong degree of interest was clearly expressed in rural 
development, with a particular leaning towards tourism. The administration of the Slovenský 
Raj national park, with its limited competences in nature conservation, serves as the State 
expert body for the management of protected areas and holds a very delicate position in this 
grouping. Due to this position, the park administration suffers from a relatively poor 
reputation in the region17. However, its initiative to certify the park under the Pan Parks 
scheme is unique and goes beyond both its formal responsibilities and standard practice in 
other Slovak national parks. Such an initiative is based on the personal attitudes of key 
representatives in the administration, who employ numerous informal institutions to 
undertake this task. Examples of this are informal consultations, joint activities with tourism 
networks and the administration’s membership (as an observer) in the Microregion network. 
It is possible to state that the park administration on one side acts as hierarchical actor 
fulfilling legal obligations given by State administration and the law, on the other side, 
elements of network approach can be identified, however these separate activities of park 
representatives toward rural cooperation are based on interpersonal trust.  
5.2 Market 
The ‘market cluster’ consists of non-state agricultural and forest land owners, with different, 
often competing economic interests within the park territory and its buffer zone. A common 
characteristic of the cluster is their exclusion from the decision making process. The nature 
conservation act restricted their private property and user rights, and the State failed to 
compensate them for the restriction of income generation potential as described in part 4. 
Thus willingness for cooperation outside the groups is largely affected by these factors.  
The grouping of farmers is relatively diverse with respect to orientation and type of 
activity, but the farmers tend to be rather passive in terms of cooperation outside of their 
grouping. More dynamics are associated with those farmers intending to adopt rural 
innovations, for example rural tourism, as they began to form rural-tourism associations, of 
which some of them are founder members. They also declared an interest to cooperate with 
                                                 
17  Very often perceived as representing a barrier to economical development in the region and further 
elaborated on in part 6 of this paper. 
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the tourism network. Another type of landowners belonging to the market cluster are different 
forest owners (state forestry, city forestry, cooperatives and individual owners). They have 
economic interests mostly in the forest industry. In summary, the market cluster is 
characterised by competing, mostly economic interests and formalised cooperative rules 
applied exclusively within each group.  
5.3 Networks 
The final cluster is that of the ‘networks’, which are voluntary groupings of individual or 
collective actors with rural interests, whose actions are based mainly on informal rules, in 
contrast with bureaucratic structures within firms (market) and formal contractual relationship 
(Jones et al. 1997). Here the political authority is no longer associated with a relation of 
subordination and one-way control (state/hierarchy) but with a set of flatly operating system 
where institutions and individuals are interlocked in multiple, reciprocal relations of 
autonomy and dependence (Bang 2003). Open-ended contracts within ‘networks’ are not 
derived from authority structures or from legal contracts. However, some members may 
establish formal contracts, but these do not define the relationship among all of the members 
(Jones et al. 1997). Their voluntary character and rural interests determine their relative 
dynamic activities in the region. The process of institutionalisation of some informal rules 
into their operation, such as access to information, mechanisms of conflict resolution and 
costs sharing, is specific to this grouping. Two actual networks represent this cluster: the 
tourism network and the self-government municipal network. 
The self-government municipal network is based on municipal activities, has voluntary 
membership and is formed through bottom-up processes. The Group consists of two actors 
Microregion Slovenský Raj (‘Microregion’) and the Association of Municipalities of SRNAP 
(‘the Association’). These two actors integrate municipalities located around the park 
boundary, three of these located directly within the territory of the park itself. The original 
motivation for their formation was due to concern over the execution of the new competence 
of several municipalities. This was given to them in the early stage of decentralisation, in 
particular the maintenance of technical equipment (wooden and iron ladders and steps) owned 
by municipalities, which are necessary to enter the park. In addition to responsibilities in the 
field of visitors’ security, such a shift of competence place self-government network into the 
strategic role as the only subjects practically controlling access to the park. ‘The Association’ 
was established in 1992, using existing experience and heritage of the former regime’s 
tourism agency. Due to this, cooperation was mostly restricted to the original competence, 
which was the maintenance and upkeep of pathways in the park; the generation of financial 
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resources to undertake this task and activities controlled by the most powerful member 
municipality. Based on dissatisfaction of several members, ‘Microregion’ was established in 
2003 as an entirely new structure with new rules of operation derived from partnerships and 
experience obtained during the transition process (1989-2003). In contrast with ‘the 
Association’, its ambitions were to support the endeavour of SRNAP to join PAN Parks, 
support nature conservation in SRNAP, diversify cultural activities and support traditional 
crafts and cooperate in the provision of tourism services. At present, membership of the two 
networks is quite fuzzy, since several member municipalities have dual membership. These 
two groups are effectively rivals however, representing the first informal partnerships and 
cooperative processes in the region. 
The tourism network is of a different character due to its very specialised interests. The 
grouping is composed of different kinds of actors with mixed type of actions connected to 
tourism. The first of these are agencies established by formal processes, represented by the 
regional development agency in Spisská Nová Ves. The second grouping comprises of 
voluntary commercial tourism agencies, tour operators for bed and breakfast facilities or 
individual clients both operating exclusively within the target region. The Regional 
Development Agency represents State interests while the Civic Associations for agro-tourism 
development are new actors and support the adoption of agro-tourism in the region. In 
between these extremes, two actors – the farmers and the rural tourism associations- represent 
the specific interests of members within the grouping. Their relation to most of the other 
actors is co-operative or neutral. Finally, the association of tourist entrepreneurs differs 
slightly from the previous. It comprises of independent entrepreneurs in tourism, offering 
mostly accommodation or others tourism services. Within the region of Spisská Nová Ves, we 
identified two of those kinds of associations; one which consists of entrepreneurs mainly from 
north-east of the region and the second representing the south of the region. Both of them are 
based on voluntary association; however members have to pay subscription fees. The aim of 
these associations is to support tourism and sport activities within the region. The main 
benefit of being a member of that kind of association is reducing transaction costs for 
promoting individual tourism. 
6 Shifting Governance in SRNAP 
Trust framed within the context of interpersonal trust as introduced by Brehm and Rahn 
(1997) and applied in our study by the structural model of social capital (Figure 1) forms the 
first part of our analyses. In general, trust between actors was observed on an individual level, 
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based on interpersonal attitudes and relations between individuals. There is a specific low 
trust attitude by the actors to the Roma community18. There was a low level of trust expressed 
for formalised networks, and evidence of this came from the low levels of membership in 
formal networks. 
Firstly, there are still a considerable number of actors who display opportunism and behave 
as free-riders (not being a member) due to various reasons, such as lack of benefit or, on the 
contrary, membership is understood rather as an obligatory step towards achieving a formal 
reputation.  Membership in regional or local non-hierarchical groupings was perceived in 
positive terms as representing a benefit for members’ activities. They especially appreciated 
the possibilities for cooperation, the realisation of common projects and information 
dissemination. Only two representatives, both from municipalities, declared an eventual loss 
(or costs) of membership in the case of non-realised projects; as well as this, the subscription 
fee was assessed as a loss in the case of formal membership.  
A higher level of optimism was observed with respect to the agenda and the influence of 
national governance when compared to the supranational level i.e. the EU. Similarly, for local 
government, actors reported an increase in trust compared to interregional level (where newly 
established regional government is perceived as an unknown structure with no direct effects 
arising from positive experiences of actors).    
It is possible to generalise that the more local  the level of governance, the higher the trust 
or that interpersonal trust prevails in the SRNAP community. A reciprocal relationship 
between trust and cooperation as described in first structural link of social capital model 
(Brehm and Rahn 1997, Figure 1) was evident in our case study.  
 Most of the actors declared a degree of reservation in trusting the park administration, 
which, despite limited competences, is misperceived as the State representative for nature 
conservation in the park. The governance structure currently in place has resulted in the 
inefficient use of resources and the treatment of common property as though it were open-
access. Thus it is possible to argue that it is the failure of the national government in creating 
adequate institutional support for rural development regarding nature protection.  
This weakly established governance structure creates various barriers also to market 
development. At present, decision-making allows the development of power games, in which 
individual interests prevail over the public: actors often behave strategically in order to put 
themselves in more powerful positions with good information and control over ongoing 
                                                 
18  Here, low trust generally prevailed depending on the historical context and/or importance of the problem to 
the actor and the community and is reciprocal. Due to its specific character, the complex Roma issue is 
considered in a separate paper (Kluvankova-Oravska, Bizikova, forthcoming). 
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processes. In contrast, those whose positions are not strong enough can be characterised by a 
loss of interest, apathy or even opportunism. In-depth interviews disclosed that many actors 
were not able to assess the competitiveness of their activities on the market, and that the role 
of active marketing was generally underestimated19.  Thus the national park is not understood 
as a product of regional economy but rather as an economic barrier to the execution of private 
or common property rights and rural policies.  
 Based on our findings, it is possible to say that the absence of appropriate formal 
institutions to govern common pool resources hinder cooperation and market development in 
the region.  Thus low trust in certain formal institutions (hierarchies) allows for the 
emergence of new ways of governance in which State and market can be integrated to provide 
effective coordination, new structures, more efficient and more effective blend of 
governmental and nongovernmental forces (Goodwin 1998).  
The initiative of SRNAP to introduce the Pan Parks scheme serves as a good example, 
offering sufficient economic incentive and marketing instruments to support the local 
economy via biodiversity values in the park and thus promoting synergy between nature 
conservation and local development through sustainable tourism. Moreover the Pan Park 
scheme promotes cooperation within the park community. It joins the activities of park 
administration and the tourism association while the park administration membership (as an 
observer) in the municipalities’ network, shifts the park administration towards a network 
governance structure. Such kinds of associations allow actors to interact with one another 
more frequently and to use open-ended contracts. This enables social mechanisms such as 
macro-culture (common values and norms shared across actors), reputation and conflict 
resolution to improve coordination and thus better cooperation in multi-actors situation such 
as SRNAP community.  
The presence of macroculture in geographically concentrated areas enhances the likelihood 
of network governance emerging and thriving (Goodwin 1998). This was also proven in our 
case study where actors declared that due to geographic distance and thus different common 
set of values of the communities, cooperation and establishment of one common tourism 
network within the territory of the park is not possible20. As a consequence three different 
tourism networks have emerged in the territory of the national park.   
                                                 
19  Exceptions to this were found in the national park administration, which emphasized the importance of the 
out-of-park investments and activities aimed at introducing controlled access to the park and to attract 
visitors by the cultural landscape outside park territory.  
20  Actors from north of the park declare that they do not belong to the same community as actors from the south 
of the park. 
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Reputation together with previous experience in cooperation and interpersonal trust 
emerged as the two key factors essential for actors’ cooperation. One of the examples is the 
association of tourism entrepreneurs, which exists for almost 15 years. Trust and reputation 
developed within this association, increased the willingness for collective problem-solving 
and thus increased the potential for cooperation (to attract more guests to their guesthouses, 
they support infrastructure construction and improvement of tourism services within the 
region). Another example is the establishment of ‘microregion’ as a consequence of negative 
previous experience in ‘the association’ and the negative reputation of some actors within that 
network.  Since activities of ‘association’ were basically unilateral (focused only on the 
maintenance of technical equipment), this created dissatisfaction of some of their members 
and thus initiation of establishment of ‘microregion’ aiming for rural development within the 
region21. Now ‘microregion’ is concentrated on coordination of different tourism activities, 
publishing of advertising tourism brochures and utilising EU funds. 
In considering the mechanism for conflict-solving, half of the actors declared that they 
would first contact the individual who they thought was causing the problem; the other half 
would initialise a meeting of the entire group. Generally, we can summarize from this that 
actors do not expect solution of problems to come from outside and also that the existence of 
a regional or local leader has not been observed. Based on these findings, we can assume that 
the mechanism for solving conflicts within a grouping of actors in this case study is rather 
informal and that methods are case-specific.   
Despite some positive features described above, social mechanisms for cooperation have 
not been fully developed yet. Thus we may conclude that cooperation within hierarchies and 
imperfect markets is not understood as a vital part of governance, nor as a mechanism to 
reduce transaction costs. Such evidence was exhibited in our analyses where questions related 
to the costs of meetings and extra costs borne in building cooperation such as time and effort 
were not taken into account or were underestimated by almost all actors.  However  the costs 
borne by actors who formerly operated within the socialistic hierarchical structures were 
found higher than those whose organisational structures and rules were set up under the 
present regime. Such new structures, e.g. the ‘network’ cluster, thus represent the only 
positive examples where cooperation within the network reduces transaction costs. Especially 
within the associations of tourism entrepreneurs, members themselves confirm a reduction of 
transaction costs (specially in the area of advertisement) as one of the benefits to be in 
association. 
                                                 
21  For more details see part 4. 
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To sum up, trust based on interpersonal relations dominate this case study. This is not trust of 
the organisation as a whole; it is trust of known representatives. The State plays a central role 
in the issue of trust, although in this case, it is only perceived in a negative sense due to 
inefficiency in the prevailing governance. However, behaviour of newly established actors 
shows openness to discussion and formalisation of modern institutional components into their 
rules of operation. The hierarchical post-socialistic system, with a limited exchange of 
information, is slowly opening and allowing the emergence of network forms of governance.  
The use of social mechanisms enhances co-operative processes amongst particular actors as 
manifested also in Figure 3. The most visible evidence of this can be observed within 
grouping networks, where the character and intensity of cooperation is rapidly growing. 
Further dynamics of this grouping may generate additional expansion and thus increase the 
potential of the community to facilitate self-organisation and shift to multilevel governance. 
7 Conclusion 
The governance structure in place is still traumatised by post socialist relations, particularly 
inefficient institutional design and non-robust governance of the resources. It has resulted in 
inefficient use of resources and treating common property as open-access. Trust observed in 
our case study was relatively high, but dominated by interpersonal relations. This is not trust 
in an organisation as a whole; it is trust of known representatives. Thus the level of general 
trust in formalised rules lags behind interpersonal trust. The State plays a central role in the 
issue of trust, in particular failing to ensure a robust governance structure for common pool 
resources in protected areas under the multilevel actors situation and marker economy. This 
was found as a barrier for market development and prevented the national park being viewed 
as an asset. Instead it was seen as an economic barrier to the execution of private or common 
property rights.  Therefore we may summarise, that only one structural link - reciprocal 
relationship between civic participation and interpersonal trust - of Brehm and Rahn’s (1997) 
social capital model was proven in our case study. 
Furthermore, revealed low trust in formal institutions, determines the establishment of 
complex and multilevel networks of interconnected actors, rather than hierarchical 
governance defined by the central State. The theoretical foundation applied in our study 
integrates a general theory of network governance and common-pool resource theory by using 
different social mechanisms or design principles in order to manifest positive effect of such 
structures in enhancing cooperative behaviour. Our experience shows that, the use of social 
mechanisms, such as macrocultures, reputation and conflict resolution enhances co-operative 
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processes and the learning process amongst particular actors. The most visible evidence of 
this can be observed within the networks cluster, where the character and intensity of 
cooperation is rapidly growing. Participatory governance is forming the new institutional 
setting and establishing rules of cooperation. Thus there is a shift in governance structures 
within the Slovensky Raj national park. Further dynamics of this grouping may generate 
additional expansion and thus increase the potential of the community to facilitate self-
organisation and shift to multilevel governance.  
It is possible to conclude that cooperation is gradually moving from externally to internally 
driven. The hierarchical governance structure is slowly opening up and enhancing 
coordination and cooperation between various actors. But radical changes in governance 
structure and management of the park are required in order to safeguard the high natural 
values of the Slovensky Raj national park as well as the expansion of a sustainable rural 
economy.  
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